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I. Introduction
In Cone v. Bell,' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit overruled the District Court's denial of a
prisoner's habeas corpus petition. The Sixth Circuit held
that the jury relied on an unconstitutional statutory
aggravating factor in its decision to impose the death
sentence. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case
with instructions to grant the habeas corpus petition,
thereby vacating Cone's death sentence.
2
After convicting Gary Bradford Cone of two counts
of first degree murder for brutally killing an elderly couple,
the jury sentenced Cone to death.3 The jury found four
aggravating factors were present, including, in particular,
that the murders were "especially heinous, atrocious and
cruel."4 In his habeas corpus petition, Cone argued that the
terms "heinous, atrocious and cruel" were
unconstitutionally vague.5 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit was
asked to decide whether Cone's death sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.6
Before addressing Cone's Eighth Amendment
challenge, the Sixth Circuit resolved two key preliminary
1 Cone v. Bell, 359 F.3d 785 (6th Cir. 2004).
2 Id. at 799.
3 Id. at 787; Cone v. Bell, 243 F.3d 961,965 (6th Cir. 2001).
4 Cone, 243 F.3d at 965; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i) (2003)
(citing 12 aggravating factors that a jury can consider in deciding
whether to impose death penalty when defendant has been convicted of
first degree murder). Many courts refer to the "especially heinous,
atrocious and cruel" factor as the "HAC aggravator," and I will also
refer to it as such throughout this note.
5 See Cone, 243 F.3d 961 (affirming district court's refusal to issue writ
of habeas corpus).
6 Cone, 359 F.3d at 787.
2
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issues.7 First, the court held that under Tennessee law, the
Tennessee Supreme Court implicitly reviews a death
sentence for arbitrariness, regardless of whether the
challenge is explicitly asserted by the petitioner.8 Second,
the court held that although the petitioner did not explicitly
raise an Eighth Amendment claim in his first petition for
post-conviction relief, the issue had been implicitly
reviewed by the Tennessee Supreme Court. Accordingly,
Cone's Eighth Amendment challenge had not been
"procedurally defaulted" and, therefore, was a valid
consideration for the court. 9
After resolving the preliminary issues, the Sixth
Circuit analyzed Cone's primary Eighth Amendment claim.
Granting Cone's habeas corpus petition, the court held that
the Tennessee Supreme Court's implicit decision regarding
the constitutionality of the HAC aggravator was contrary to
"clearly established" United States Supreme Court
precedent existing at the time of Cone's state court
conviction.10 By vacating Cone's death sentence, the Sixth
Circuit furthered the primary purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus - to ensure that a petitioner's imprisonment is
lawful.
Astonishingly, three years earlier, in 2001, the Sixth
Circuit had concluded that it was unnecessary to address
Cone's vagueness challenge when it determined he was
entitled to habeas relief. Taken together theses decisions
emphasize that, when reviewing a state prisoner's sentence
and conviction for the purposes of a habeas corpus petition,





10 Id. at 797.
3
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II. The Development of Habeas Relief for State
Prisoners Sentenced to Death
A. Writ of Habeas Corpus. A Historical Perspective
A writ of habeas corpus is most often used to
examine the legality of the petitioner's imprisonment."'
The writ of habeas corpus originated in England in the
thirteenth century. As is evidenced by its inclusion in the
Constitution, the Founders clearly recognized the
importance of the writ of habeas corpus. 2 Initially, only a
federal prisoner could petition a court for habeas corpus
relief.13  However, in 1867, the Habeas Corpus Act
extended the writ to include state prisoners and enabled
federal courts to grant the writ in "all cases where any
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of
the [C]onstitution."' 14 Although the federal habeas corpus
statute has undergone numerous amendments since its
enactment, the "jurisdictional grant" endured. 5
Today, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 gives federal courts
the authority to grant habeas corpus relief. 16 The current
version of Section 2254 contains revised procedural
guidelines that a court must follow in granting the writ to
state prisoners.' 7  Congress, however, did not pass
11 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 715 (7th ed. 1999).
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, §9 cl. 2 ("The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or
invasion the public safety may require it."); Stuart E. Walker, Note,
"What We Meant Was.. "The Supreme Court Clarifies Two
Ineffective Assistance Cases in Bell v. Cone, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1271,
1275 (2003).
1 3 Walker, supra note 12.
14 Id. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28 § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
15 Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 362, 375 (2000).
16 Walker, supra note 12.
17 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2004).
4
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legislation outlining these substantive guidelines until April
24, 1996, when it enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (hereinafter the "AEDPA"). 18  The
AEDPA limited the circumstances under which a federal
court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner.' 9 The
most substantial change effectuated by the AEDPA
regarding federal habeas relief came in the form of an
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated
on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim- (1) resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court
proceeding. 20
B. From Teague to Williams: The Evolution of Federal
Habeas Corpus Practice
Prior to the AEDPA amendments, state prisoners
had greater latitude from which to appeal their convictions.
More specifically, habeas relief was not limited only to
18 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of title 28 of the
U.S. Code).
19 Id.
20 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added).
5
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decisions that were either "contrary to" or "unreasonable
applications of clearly established Federal law."
1. Teague v. Lane Sets the Stage
The limitation on habeas relief originated with the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Teague v. Lane.21 In
Teague, during the process of jury selection, the prosecutor
utilized all ten of his preemptory challenges to exclude
potential black jurors. Subsequently, the defendant, a black
man, was convicted of attempted murder and other related
offenses by an all-white jury.22 On appeal, the petitioner
argued that he had been "denied [] the right to be tried by a
jury that represented a fair cross section of the
community."23
In ruling on Teague's habeas claim, the Court
clarified when a "new rule" should be applied retroactively
and when a petitioner's claim for habeas relief is
procedurally barred in collateral review cases.24 According
to the Court, "[a] case announces a new rule if the result
was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant's conviction became final. 2m Hence, the Court
adopted Judge Harlan's view of retroactivity for collateral
review cases and found two narrow exceptions to the
general rule that "new rules" should not be applied
retroactively. 26
21 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
22 Id. at 292-93.
23 Id. at 293.
24 See, e.g., Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989) (holding that "a
procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on
either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a
judgment in the case 'clearly and expressly' states that its judgment
rests on a state procedural bar").
25 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
26 Id. at 307; Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682 (1971).
6
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According to the Court, a "new rule" should be
applied retroactively "if it places 'certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe' or "if it
requires the observance of 'those procedures that ...are
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' ' 27 Ultimately,
the Court "noted the fundamental importance of finality to
our system of criminal justice and commented that
'[w]ithout [it], the criminal law is deprived of much of its
deterrent effect.'
28
2. Williams v. Taylor Aligns the Supreme
Court with the Post-AEDPA Writ
Eleven years later, in Williams v. Taylor,29 the Supreme
Court thoroughly analyzed the scope of habeas corpus
relief, when it interpreted the amended version of 28
U.S.C. § 2245(d)(1) 30 for the first time. Williams, a state
prisoner convicted of capital murder, collaterally attacked
his conviction, arguing that his attorney failed to discover
mitigating evidence during sentencing. 3' After exhausting
his state court remedies, Williams sought a writ of habeas
corpus in district court.32
27 Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693).
28 Walker, supra note 12, at 1277 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 309).
29 Williams, 529 U.S. at 362; see also Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S.
156, 168 (2000) ("On review of state decisions in habeas corpus, state
courts are responsible for a faithful application of the principles set out
in the controlling opinion of the [Supreme] Court.").
30 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2004) ("An application for a writ of habeas
corpus... shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim - resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.")
(emphasis added).
'3 Williams, 529 U.S. at 370-71.
32 Id. at 372.
7
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The federal trial judge granted the petition, holding
that Williams's sentence was unconstitutional because it
was reasonable to conclude that his punishment would have
been different but for his counsel's failure to discover the
mitigating evidence. The Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court's decision, however, holding "that a federal
court may issue habeas relief only if 'the state courts have
decided the question by interpreting or applying the
relevant precedent in a manner that reasonable jurists
would all agree is unreasonable. ' ' ' 4  Ultimately, the
Supreme Court granted Williams's petition for habeas relief
concluding that "the Virginia Supreme Court rendered a
'decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law.'35
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens noted that
the "AEDPA codifie[d] Teague to the extent that Teague
requires federal habeas courts to deny relief that is
contingent upon a rule of law not clearly established at the
time the state conviction became final. 36 While Teague
prohibited a reliance on "new rules,"37 the AEDPA
expanded that premise, mandating that habeas relief be
granted only if the claim's adjudication "resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."
38
Consequently, the AEDPA did not simply codify the
Teague holding. Rather, it expressly limited the
application of the Teague holding to those cases where a
" Id. at 373.
34 Id. at 376 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860, 865 (4th Cir.
1998)).
31 Williams, 529 U.S. at 399.
31 Id. at 380.
37 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
38 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections
of title 28 of the U.S. Code).
8
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lower court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent
existing at the time of the petitioner's state court
conviction.39
Additionally, the Williams Court carefully
considered the standard of review applicable to habeas
corpus proceedings. In particular, the Court analyzed the
phrases "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" as
they are used in § 2254(d)(1). 40 Ultimately, the majority
relied on the Webster's Dictionary to define the phrase
"contrary to" as meaning "in conflict with."' 4 The
majority stated that the phrase was broad enough "to
include a finding that the state-court 'decision' [wa]s
simply 'erroneous' or wrong. ' 42 Furthermore, the majority
noted that "there is nothing in the phrase ... that implies
anything less than independent review by the federal
courts." 43
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor faulted
the majority's failure "to give independent meaning to both
the 'contrary to' and 'unreasonable application' clauses of
[28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)]."44 Justice O'Connor reasoned
that Section 2254(d)(1) provides two distinct types of cases
where a state prisoner can obtain federal habeas relief,
assuming the state court claim is adjudicated on the
merits. 4 5 Justice O'Conner emphasized that "[u]nder the
statute, a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if
the relevant state-court decision was either (1) 'contrary
39 Williams, 529 U.S. at 380.
40 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (mandating that court only grant writ if
petitioner's state court conviction resulted in decision that was
"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law").
41 Williams, 529 U.S. at 388.
42 Id. at 389.
431id.
44 Id. at 404 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (referring to the "contrary to"
and "unreasonable application" clauses of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
41 Id. at 404-05.
9
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to...clearly established Federal law'...or (2) 'involved an
unreasonable application of...clearly established Federal
law."46 The concurring opinion illustrated two scenarios in
which a state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court
precedent. Similarly, the concurring opinion also
identified two scenarios in which a state court decision
involves an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court
precedent. '8
3. The Court Remains True to the Purpose of
Habeas Corpus Relief as Envisioned in 1867
Although the AEDPA modified the scope of habeas
relief, the purpose of the writ remains intact. Today, the
writ of habeas corpus continues to ensure that criminal
sentences are properly imposed. More specifically, in
analyzing a state prisoner's sentence, federal courts often
must examine both the constitutionality of the sentencing
guidelines as well as the jury's interpretation of these
guidelines.
46 id.
47 Id. at 405-06:
First, a state-court decision is contrary to this Court's
precedent if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite
to that reached by this Court on a question of law.
Second, a state-court decision is also contrary to this
Court's precedent if the state court confronts facts that are
materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme
Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to ours.
48 Id. The first scenario arises when a "state court identifies the correct
legal rule... but unreasonably applies it to the facts." The second
scenario, on the other hand, occurs when a "state court either
unreasonably extends a legal principle.., to a new context where it
should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a
new context where it should apply."
10
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C. Vague Aggravating Circumstances and Eighth
Amendment Rights
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
forbids the infliction of "cruel and unusual" punishment. 49
For more than thirty years, the Supreme Court has been
committed "to guiding sentencers' discretion so as to
'minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action,' and to achieve principled distinctions between
those who receive the death penalty and those who do not."
50 In accordance with the Supreme Court's commitment,
many state legislatures have enacted statutory aggravating
circumstances to limit the factfinder's discretion in
imposing the death penalty. 51
To avoid being labeled unconstitutionally vague,
"an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the
class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence
on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder., 52 Therefore, the proper analysis of a vagueness
claim focuses on whether the challenged aggravating
49 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also TENN. CONST. art. I, § 16.
50 Tuilaepa v. Proctor, 512 U.S. 967,995 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); see also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980)
(concluding that "if a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it
has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a
manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death
p enalty").
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 872 (1983); see, e.g., TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-204(i).
52 Zant, 462 U.S. at 877; see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258
(1976) (noting that because "the sentencing authority's discretion is
guided and channeled by requiring examination of specific factors that
argue in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty,"
arbitrariness and capriciousness in imposing the death penalty are
eliminated).
11
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circumstance adequately informs the jury as to what it must
find in order to impose the death penalty. 53
The constitutionality of a death sentence hinges on
two primary issues: (1) whether the defendant is eligible
for the death penalty and (2) whether the defendant should
receive a death sentence.- 4  For example, a defendant
convicted of murder is eligible for the death penalty if the
factfinder determines that at least one aggravating
circumstance is present. 55 Additionally, the aggravating
circumstance must not apply to every defendant convicted
of murder5 6 and must not be unconstitutionally vague.57
Assuming the defendant is eligible for the death penalty,
the sentencer must then decide whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death. 58 In this part of the analysis,
"[w]hat is important... is an individualized determination
on the basis of the character of the individual and the
circumstances of the crime.",
59
While the eligibility determination "fits the crime
within a defined classification, "6  the selection
determination "requires individualized sentencing and must
be expansive enough to accommodate relevant mitigating
evidence so as to assure an assessment of the defendant's
53 Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356,361-62 (1988).
14 Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971-72.
55 id. at 971-72; see, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-46
Q1988); Zant, 462 U.S. at 878.
6 Id. at 972; see Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 ("If the sentencer
fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every
defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is
constitutionally infirm.").
57 Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972; Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 ("If a State
wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional
responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.").
58 Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972.
59 Zant, 462 U.S. at 879.
60 Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 879.
12
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culpability.",61 Ultimately, "[w]hen only a narrow subclass
of murderers can be subjected to the death penalty, the risk
of cruel and unusual punishment... is diminished.
6 1
To overcome a vagueness challenge, the statutory
HAC aggravator used to impose the death penalty must
contain a limiting construction.63 In other words, the plain
language of the statutory HAC aggravator must inherently
limit the application of the death penalty. 64 In general,
however, the aggravator is inherently vague because it is
hard to imagine a person who would not believe that
murder itself is "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 65
Therefore, in order to uphold the integrity of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, a decision to impose the death sentence must
be "based on reason rather than caprice or emotion. ' 66
The Tennessee Supreme Court first addressed the
HAC aggravator in State v. Dicks.67 In Dicks, the jury
found Jeffrey Stuart Dicks guilty of first degree murder for
killing a store owner during the commission of a crime.68
During sentencing, the jury found that three aggravating
circumstances and zero mitigating circumstances were
present and, therefore, recommended that Dicks receive the
death penalty. 69 In particular, the jury deemed the murder




62 Id. at 982 (Stevens, J., concurring).
63 Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363.
64 Id.
66 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
67 State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126 (Tenn. 1981).
68 /d. at 127.
69 Id. at 128.
70 Id.
13
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Upon review, the Tennessee Supreme Court applied
a narrow interpretation of Tennessee's HAC aggravator,71
defining "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" as a
"'conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily
tortuous to the victim.' ' 72 Adhering to the United States
Supreme Court decision in Proffitt v. Florida, s which
interpreted a similar Florida statutory aggravator, the
Tennessee Supreme Court rejected Dicks's argument that
the Tennessee statutory HAC aggravator was
unconstitutionally vague.. ' 74
D. Cone's Crime Spree and the Ensuing Criminal
Proceedings
On August 9, 1980, Cone's crime spree began when
he robbed a jewelry store in Memphis, Tennessee.75 While
attempting to drive away, Cone was spotted by police and a
high speed chase ensued.76 Cone abandoned his car in a
residential neighborhood, shot both a police officer and a
citizen, and attempted to shoot a third person who refused
to give Cone his car.77 The following day, Cone again
appeared in the same residential area and pulled a gun on a
woman after she refused to let him use her phone.78 The
two-day crime spree concluded after Cone broke into an
elderly couple's home and brutally murdered the couple
after they refused his demands for help. 79 Cone was later
71 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13 -204(i)(5).
72 See Dicks, 615 S.W.2d at 132 (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1,9
lfla. 1973)).
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56.
74 Dicks, 615 S.W.2d at 132.
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arrested and charged with two counts of first degree murder
for the elderly couple's deaths.
80
After the jury convicted Cone of first degree murder
as well as several other offenses committed during the two-
day crime spree, Cone appealed directly to the Tennessee
Supreme Court, challenging both his conviction and death
sentence.8s Pursuant to TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-205, the
Tennessee Supreme Court conducted a mandatory review
of Cone's death sentence, which was consolidated with
Cone's direct appeal.8 2  After reviewing the four
aggravating factors the jury relied upon during Cone's
sentencing, the court concluded:
(1) that the evidence supported the finding
that Cone had been convicted previously of
one or more felonies involving violence; (2)
that the evidence supported the finding that
the murders were "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel in that they involved
torture or depravity of mind"; (3) that the
evidence supported the finding that the
murders were committed for the purpose of
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution;
and (4) that the evidence was insufficient to
support the jury's affirmative finding that
the petitioner "knowingly created a great
risk of death to two (2) or more persons,
other than the victim murdered, during [the]
act of murder."8 3
Accordingly, the Tennessee Supreme Court
affirmed both the first degree murder convictions and
80 Id.
81 Id.; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(a)(1) (2003).
82 TENN. CODE ANN. §39-2-205 (1982) (current version at TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-206).
83 Cone, 359 F.3d at 788 (citing State v. Cone, 665 S.W.2d 87, 94-95
(1984) (emphasis in original)).
15
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Cone's death sentence. 84  In doing so, the court also
"considered the validity of the aggravating circumstances
relied on by the jury in imposing the death penalty.,
85
On June 22, 1984, Cone filed his first state post-
conviction petition alleging that his constitutional rights
were violated due to prosecutorial misconduct and
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.86 The trial court
denied the petition, and the Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the denial of habeas relief.87  The
Tennessee Supreme Court denied Cone's request for an
appeal.88
Five years later, in his second state post-conviction
petition, Cone again alleged numerous violations of his
constitutional rights, including "an Eighth Amendment
claim that the language of the HAC aggravator considered
by the jury in the sentencing phase was unconstitutionally
vague." 89 The trial court determined that Cone's second
state post-conviction petition asserted claims that were
barred under Tennessee's post-conviction statute because
84 d.
85 Id. At the time of Cone's conviction, the death penalty could only be
imposed if the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at
least one of twelve aggravating factors existed. See TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2404(i) (1981) (current version atTENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
204(i)). After finding Cone guilty of two counts of first degree murder,
in addition to other crimes, the jury found four of the aggravating
factors listed in Section 2404(i), including (1) the defendant's previous
conviction of one or more felonies involving the use or threat of
violence; (2) the defendant "knowingly created a great risk of death to
two or more persons, other than the victim murdered, during his act of
murder;" (3) the murder was committed to avoid or prevent the
defendant's arrest; and (4) the murder was "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind."
Cone, 359 F.3d at 788.
86 Id. at 788-89.
87 Id. at 789.
88 Id.
89 Id. (emphasis added).
16
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they had either been waived or previously determined. 90
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial
court's holding. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied
Cone's application for permission to appeal, and the United
States Supreme Court denied Cone's petition for writ of
certiorari. 91
Still unsatisfied with the courts' determinations
regarding the constitutionality of his death sentence, Cone
filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in federal district
court. 92 Cone again argued that the HAC aggravator relied
upon by the jury in imposing the death penalty was
unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, violated his Eighth
Amendment rights. 93  The district court denied Cone's
petition. On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit granted the
writ of habeas corpus, holding that Cone had been
"unconstitutionally denied the effective assistance of
counsel at sentencing. ' 94
In reaching its initial decision to grant habeas relief,
the Sixth Circuit found it unnecessary to address Cone's
cruel and unusual punishment argument. 95  The U.S.
Supreme Court, however, later reversed the Sixth Circuit's
grant of the writ and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 96 On remand, the Sixth Circuit noted that the
"Tennessee Supreme Court's 'implicit decision,' upon
mandatory review of Cone's death sentence, was that the
HAC aggravator relied upon by Cone's jury in imposing
the death sentence was not arbitrary, and consequently, not
unconstitutionally vague. The court held that this
90 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-111 (1990) (repealed by Post-
Conviction Procedure Act, ch. 207 § 1) (1995).
9' Cone, 359 F.3d at 789.
92 Cone, 243 F.3d 961. Thus, Cone had exhausted Tennessee's appeal
and post-conviction procedures.
93 Cone, 359 F.3d at 789.
94 Cone, 359 F.3d at 789; Cone, 243 F.3d at 965.
95 Cone, 359 F.3d at 789; Cone, 243 F.3d at 975.
96 Cone, 359 F.3d at 795.
17
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"implicit" Tennessee Supreme Court decision "was
contrary to clearly established U.S. Supreme Court
precedent as announced in Maynard 97 and Shell 98 and
made applicable to Cone's case via the rule of retroactivity
explained in Stringer.' 99
Having determined that the HAC aggravator was
unconstitutional, the final issue hinged on whether the
jury's reliance on the invalid aggravating factor constituted
harmless error.1°°  The Sixth Circuit concluded that the
invalid aggravators "had [a] substantial and injurious effect
or influence"'0 ' on the jury's imposition of the death
sentence. 102 As a result, the Sixth Circuit reversed the
district court's decision and remanded the case instructing
the district court to "issue a writ of habeas corpus vacating
the petitioner's death sentence due to the jury's weighing
of an unconstitutionally vague aggravating factor at
sentencing."103
E. Determining the Constitutionality of the HAC
Aggravator
The fundamental issue in Cone involves the
"constitutionality of the jury's finding that the murders
97 Maynard, 486 U.S. at 356.
98 Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (per curiam).
99 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court remanded
the case for the court to consider the constitutional challenge to the
HAC aggravator raised by Cone in his petition for habeas corpus relief
Cone, 359 F.3d at 797.
100 Id. The harmless error standard is "whether the error had substantial
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Coe v.
Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 334 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that Sixth Circuit
could perform a harmless-error analysis to determine whether a jury's
reliance on the unconstitutional HAC aggravator required habeas relief)
(quotations omitted).
10' Coe, 161 F.3d at 334.
102 Cone, 359 F.3d at 799.
103 Id.
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were 'especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.""'  Before
Cone's conviction was finalized, "[n]o Supreme Court case
ha[d] addressed the precise language at issue." However,
after Cone's conviction, numerous decisions examining the
constitutionality of similar statutory language "indicate
clearly that the language of the HAC aggravator the jurors
used to sentence Cone to death ... is unconstitutionally
vague."
' 10 5
The importance of the HAC aggravator's
constitutionality is grounded in the belief that punishment
should not be arbitrary or capricious, but should be
proportionate to the criminal act. In the advent of the
AEDPA amendments to federal habeas corpus relief, Cone
argued that his death sentence was "contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States." 1 6 Consequently, Cone's habeas corpus petition is
of the utmost importance, and the judicial system was
required to carefully examine any and all constitutional
challenges raised. Furthermore, if Cone were "restrained of
his . . . liberty in violation of the constitution,"10 7 the
purpose of habeas relief, as envisioned by our forefathers,
would be seriously undermined.
IH. What Does Cone v. Bell Add to the Evolution of
Habeas Corpus Relief?
Since the AEDPA amendments to the writ of habeas
corpus took effect in 1996, courts hearing habeas petitions
have been given a kind of "instruction manual." Courts
only grant habeas corpus relief to state prisoners if the state
104 Id. at 788.
105 Id. at 795.
106 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of title 28 of the U.S.
Code).
107 14 Stat. 385.
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court adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court."' 08  Therefore, in light of the Supreme
Court's holdings in Maynard, Shell and Stringer, the jury's
reliance on the HAC aggravator in imposing the death
penalty upon Cone clearly violated his constitutional rights,
a fact that was evident when the Sixth Circuit first heard
Cone's habeas petition in 2001. According to the Sixth
Circuit:
Normally, post-Cone decisions would be
immaterial, but .. .the Supreme Court's fairly
recent application . . .of the 'non-retroactivity'
of new constitutional rules, in the context of an
Eighth Amendment vagueness challenge to a
death penalty instruction, makes several post-
Cone Supreme Court decisions not only
material, but controlling. 109
After Cone's conviction, the Court addressed whether the
language "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" was
unconstitutional in Maynard v. Cartwright."0 In short, the
Supreme Court determined that the vagueness ruling of
108 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(emphasis added).
109 Cone, 359 F.3d at 795; see Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992)
(addressing the "new rule" non-retroactivity doctrine in regard to
Godfrey and Maynard); see, e.g., Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363-64
(holding Oklahoma's HAC aggravator unconstitutionally vague); Shell
v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (per curiam) (holding aggravating
factor containing language "heinous, atrocious, or cruel"
unconstitutional). But see Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654
(1990) (holding "Arizona's 'especially heinous, cruel or depraved'
aggravating factor not facially vague") (emphasis added).
1 Maynard, 486 U.S. at 356.
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Godfrey, decided before Cone's conviction, was not limited
to the precise language at issue in that case."'
Therefore, "[i]n applying the language before [the
Court] in Maynard, [the] Court did not 'break new
ground."''' 2 Because the Maynard case did not "break new
ground," Godfrey clearly established the unconstitutionality
of the HAC aggravator in the early 1980's. n 3 Although
there are no "Supreme Court decisions that [are] 'on all
fours' with the instruction in Cone's case . . . Stringer's
statement that Maynard's invalidation of Oklahoma's HAC
aggravator was an 'old rule' dictated by Godfrey, points
ineluctably to the conclusion that Godfrey represents a
'clearly established' Supreme Court precedent dictating
that Tennessee's HAC aggravator is unconstitutionally
vague." 114 Therefore, Cone was entitled to habeas corpus
relief because the jury's reliance on the HAC aggravator
was "contrary to clearly established" Supreme Court
precedent existing at the time of Cone's sentencing. 115
IV. Habeas Corpus - A Procedural Safeguard for
Imposing the Death Penalty?
While some might argue that affording prisoners
sentenced to death numerous procedural means to
challenge their sentences does little to deter future crime,
"the utter finality of the death penalty may [also] cruelly
frustrate the cause of justice." Therefore, the writ of
habeas corpus acts as a procedural safeguard to ensure that
the sentencer does not apply the death penalty in an
arbitrary or capricious manner. For, "[o]nce the prisoner
111 Stringer, 503 U.S. at 228-29.
112 Id. (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407,412 (1989)).113 Cone, 359 F.3d at 796.
11
4 Id. at 796-97.
115 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
116 Dicks, 615 S.W.2d at 136 (Brock, C.J., dissenting).
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has been put to death by the state there can be no relief
granted although later developments in the evidence of the
case or of the controlling law may show, conclusively, that
the penalty was mistakenly inflicted."' 7 Consequently, it
is crucial that prisoners sentenced to death are afforded an
opportunity to seek habeas relief to ensure that death is a
proper and proportionate punishment.
When the Sixth Circuit first addressed Cone's
petition for habeas corpus, it did not determine whether the
HAC aggravator was unconstitutional." 8  After the
Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's grant of habeas
relief, however, the Sixth Circuit had to confront this
constitutional challenge." 9 In failing to dispose of the
issue the first time around, the Sixth Circuit wasted
valuable time and resources. There is no doubt that this
was all in an effort to ensure that Cone was not put to death
unless his trial and sentence had been properly adjudicated.
Yet the question remains - was Cone really entitled to
habeas corpus relief? The answer is yes. Cone was entitled
to habeas corpus relief from the moment the jury
recommended the death penalty.
Although the jury recommended that Cone be
sentenced to death in 1984, the Sixth Circuit did not grant
habeas corpus relief until 2004. Why did the court not get
it right the first time? Cone challenged the constitutionally
of the HAC aggravator in his initial habeas proceedings in
2001, but the Sixth Circuit never addressed this
constitutional challenge once it determined that Cone was
entitled to habeas relief on his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. Had the court ruled on both issues in 2001,
the habeas proceeding may not have reached the Supreme
Court only to be remanded again to the Sixth Circuit.
117 id.
118 Cone, 243 F.3d at 961.
119 Cone, 359 F.3d at 789.
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The Supreme Court requires that "a jury be given
guidance . . . when the death penalty is a possible
punishment."'' 20 This requirement stems from the idea that
"death remains as the only punishment that may involve the
conscious infliction of physical pain. . ., [and] mental pain
is an inseparable part . . . of punishing criminals by death,
for the prospect of ending execution exacts a frightful toll
during the inevitable long wait between the imposition of
sentence and the actual infliction of death."121
Additionally, the time between the sentence and the actual
execution is compounded by a prisoner's right to habeas
corpus relief. Given this option, few prisoners idley await
execution. Instead, they file numerous post-trial
proceedings, including a habeas corpus petition. The
question then becomes - is this all merely an effort to
postpone impending death or to prove that the death
sentence is improper under the circumstances of a given
case?
It has been almost twenty years since Cone was
sentenced to death for the brutal murders of an elderly
couple. Unfortunately, the importance of the jury's
determination that the murders committed by Cone fit into
the category of "especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel"
and that the death penalty was the proper punishment has
diminished. Cone's case is so far removed from the actual
events of August 9, 1980, that it has become lost in a mess
of legal minutia that now focuses on Cone's life instead of
the elderly couples' deaths.
If nothing else, Cone's case should illustrate the
diligence with which federal courts should analyze habeas
corpus petitions in the future. If the Sixth Circuit analyzed
the constitutionally of the HAC aggravator in 2001, or
better yet, if the Tennessee Supreme Court properly
120 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192 (1976).
121 Furman, 408 U.S. at 288 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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analyzed the HAC factor in 1984, Cone might be serving a
life sentence without parole. 22
The Tennessee Supreme Court arrived at a
conclusion that was opposite to existing Supreme Court
precedent when it "implicitly reviewed" Cone's death
sentence and found that the HAC aggravator was
constitutional.' 23 In short, the HAC aggravator does not
"achieve principled distinction between those who receive
the death penalty and those who do not."1 24  The
Tennessee's HAC aggravator does not narrow the class of
people eligible for the death penalty because any murder
may be deemed "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel"
and, therefore, a finding of the same is totally arbitrary.
Furthermore, the HAC aggravator relied upon in Cone is
unconstitutional because neither the aggravating
circumstance's plain language nor the court's attempt to
limit the construction thereof adequately informed the jury
of what it needed to find in order to punish Cone by death.
Even assuming that Tennessee's HAC aggravator
was constitutional and did not apply to every first degree
murder committed and that, therefore, Cone was "eligible"
for the death penalty, he should not have received the death
penalty. In the end, as the Sixth Circuit seemed to
conclude, the jury relied on emotion in deciding to
recommend a death sentence. For that reason, the sentence
was capricious. 125 As a result, the Sixth Circuit correctly
determined that the unconstitutionality of the HAC
aggravator had an injurious effect on the jury's sentence
122 See Cone, 243 F.3d at 961; Cone, 665 S.W.2d at 87.
123 See n.46 supra.
124 See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 995.
125 The narrow construction articulated in Dicks is also arbitrary
because it does not define what is meant by "unnecessarily tortuous" in
the same way that the HAC aggravator does not define what is
"especially heinous, atrocious or cruel."
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and properly instructed the district court to grant Cone's
habeas corpus petition, reversing his death sentence.
V. Conclusion
The death penalty is an unnecessary punishment
because "[s]ociety would be adequately protected from the
condemned murderer by his permanent irrprisonment." 126
Since the Tennessee and federal courts should have
rectified this constitutional issue at least three years ago,
Cone properly illustrates what can happen when a court
does not get it right the first time. In the aftermath of the
Sixth Circuit's decision, federal courts analyzing habeas
corpus petitions should always examine all of a petitioner's
arguments. After all, when a state prisoner petitions the
federal courts for a habeas corpus petition, a life hangs in
the balance.
NICOLE M. GRIDA
126Dicks, 615 S.W.2d at 138 (Brock, C.J., dissenting).
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